Obliged to calculate: My School, markets, and equipping parents for calculativeness by Gobby, Brad




School of Education, Curtin University, Perth, Australia 
 
GPO Box U1987, Perth, Western Australia, 6845 





Brad Gobby is a lecturer in the School of Education at Curtin University. His areas of research 
interest include governmentality, the genealogy of the social and the relationship between school 




This paper argues neoliberal programs of government in education are equipping parents for 
calculativeness. Regimes of testing and the publication of these results and other organizational 
data are contributing to a public economy of numbers that increasingly oblige citizens to calculate. 
Using the notions of calculative and market devices, this paper examines the Australian 
Government’s My School website, which publishes academic and organizational information about 
schools, including national test results. While it is often assumed that such performance 
technologies contribute to neoliberal reform of education through school choice, the paper argues 
the website is technically limited in its capacity to facilitate the economic calculations and 
calculated action of parents resulting in school choice. The paper instead opens My School to 
analysis as a technique of governmental self-formation. Using the theoretical resources of actor-
network theory and Foucauldian scholarship, this paper complicates assumptions in the literature 
about the extent to which My School actually operates as a ‘market mechanism’. It argues My 
School attempts to cultivate a calculated form of parental educational agency, irreducible to 
economic market agency.  
 




Neoliberalism has come to define the ‘legitimate’ rationalities and means of governing social and 
economic life in many Western countries, with increasingly marketised, competitive and user-
centred institutional environments becoming the norm (Rose 1999; Rose & Miller 1992). This is 
the case in the domain of education, where the defining discourses of change are performance, 
deregulation, enterprise, accountability, and choice (Ball 2005). In Australia, recent neoliberal 
education policy has viewed education as a sector of the economy “relatively untouched by the 
big economic reform era of the Hawke and Keating governments” (Gillard 2010b, 5). There has 
also been an emphasis on autonomy, competition, transparency and responsiveness to users. 
Performance and benchmarking technologies have been crucial to operationalizing recent reform. 
In 2008, the Federal Government commenced the National Assessment Program of Literacy and 
Numeracy (NAPLAN) testing of its school students, and two years later the My School website 
was launched. The website publishes each school’s test results, and other school educational and 
organizational data. Such reforms reflect the policy as numbers phenomenon, with regimes of 
testing and benchmarking shaping policies globally, nationally and locally (Gorur 2014; Lingard 
& Rawolle 2011). This quantification of education and the ‘enumeration’ of educational policy 
and practice depend upon technologies and practices of calculation.  
 
This is an important field of inquiry. Calculation is crucial to regimes of liberal democratic 
government. In liberal democracies, the exercise of political and governmental power is tied to the 
capacity of formal political authorities and governmental agencies to know and then calculate 
about domains of existence, including the economy through economic data, and the population 
through demographic data in censuses (Rose 1991, 1999). Liberal democracies are also committed 
to a generalization of calculation. Calculative capacity must be dispersed and rendered into a 
personal activity so that individuals can exercise their autonomy reasonably by calculating about 
their lives, their commerce, and their work activities. Neoliberalism adds further weight to this 
necessity. The regulated subjectivities of neoliberalism depend on access to information and data 
because these enable increasingly ‘autonomous’ individuals and organizations to calculate about 
their choices and investments, including in education. While calculation is crucial to politics, 
government and self-government, the study of calculative devices, calculative practices and their 
relationship to politics is yet to come under close and sustained inspection (Miller 2008).  
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the calculative dimension of My School, work already 
being undertaken by Gorur (2013). Based on the education reform literature, we can confidently 
begin this examination of My School from the premise that it incites its users to calculate. My 
School is a website established in 2010 by the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting 
Authority (ACARA) during the rule of the Australian Labor Party. The party came to power with 
an education policy calling for an ‘education revolution’ focused on improving quality and equity. 
Standardized national testing of students (NAPLAN) commenced in 2008 as a means to provide a 
clear picture of educational outcomes and to identity those at educational risk across the nation. 
The My School website collates, organizes and publishes this data, along with other data collected 
from schools and state education bureaucracies. As a benchmarking technology (Larner & Le 
Heron 2004), the website takes account of school performance and indexes it to national standards 
and the performance of other schools. At the heart of this benchmarking ‘is the idea that 
quantitative measure of performance can be used to compare spatially and organizationally 
discrete systems, activities and individuals’ (Larner & Le Heron 2004, 218). This quantification 
renders calculable the activities and ‘performance’ of schools by a range of interested groups 
including parents, principals, teachers and policymakers. The effect of this calculation is 
‘government by numbers’ (Powers 1997; Rose 1999). For example, with ‘a new level of 
sensitivity to the question of ‘where are we situated?’’ (Larner & Le Heron 2004, 227), 
performance in measured criteria and the perception of performance become the focus of schools’ 
calculated activities (ALP 2010; Hardy 2014; Lingard & Sellar 2013; Niesche 2013). 
 
This paper examines the calculative device of My School in relation to parents, an important target 
user group of the site. My School has been characterized as a political technology for positioning 
parents more centrally to the provision of education than they are currently by enabling market 
calculations and school choice. According to Reddon and Low (2012), My School arises ‘from a 
framework of normalized neoliberal assumptions that model public goods on market transactions’ 
(Redden & Low 2012, 35-36). With the inputs and outputs of schools rendered numerical, each 
figure putatively ‘acts like market data’, signaling quality, with the intended effect being that the 
‘values measured increase’ (Redden and Low 2012, 36). In this account, My School enables 
comparisons of quality and in doing so equips parents to ‘become competent and capable of 
exercising choice’ (Gorur 2013, 224) in a market of education providers. In the parlance of Callon 
and Muniesa (2005), My School is a calculative device that contributes to the operation of a 
market. But, there are questions about how My School operates as a calculative market device. 
Consider, for example, the ambiguity about how My School is used by parents. The parents in 
Rowe and Windle’s (2012) study ‘relegated the ‘My School’ website to a latter instrument of 
school choice, with data indicating that whilst most participants viewed data, they have declined 
to utilize it’ (2012, 148). This speaks to the complexity of school choice. Choice is shaped by 
factors like location, government regulation and parental motivation, and parents employ a range 
of strategies when choosing, including using qualitative information such as school reputation 
(Ball & Vincent 1998; Campbell et al. 2009; Francis & Hutchings 2013). Given these complex 
influences, My School might not be an effective tool for choice-making.  
 
The suggestion is not that My School is not a market device animating the market rationalities of 
neoliberalism. My School is partly forged out of the economic discourses of choice, efficiency and 
competition. At the time of its development, the discourse of education reform was that reform is 
to be accomplished through “improved market design – so that we work to create the conditions in 
which markets serve the public interest through vigorous competition, transparent information, 
greater choice and becoming more responsive to the needs of service users” (Gillard 2010b, 5). 
But, My School is irreducible to the status of economic instrument facilitating parent school 
choice. As the above quote suggests, markets are used to achieve a number of ends, not simply 
consumer choice, but also transparency and responsiveness. Transparency and responsiveness are 
related to a powerful and persistent liberal problematisation of state institutions, which concerns 
the dangers posed by institutions that become closed, ensconced with self-serving interests, and 
which pose the danger of operating according to principles that undermine the proper conduct of 
government (Hindess 1998). Therefore, the political objectives of transparency and 
responsiveness serve to open the institution of schooling to public scrutiny and involvement, with 
the latter achieved through ‘active’ citizenship (Dean 1999). Correspondingly, the former Federal 
Education Minister Julia Gillard argued of My School that ‘information is important, it empowers 
parents’ (Gillard 2010a). My School enables parents to avail themselves of data, know their 
children’s school’s performance, and then influence the school’s service provision (ALP 2010; 
Gillard 2009; OECD 2012). As well, the former ACARA Chairman Barry McGaw commented 
‘many parents have no choice’ when it comes to choosing a school, and therefore My School 
‘makes public what was otherwise privately known and produces an obligation to do something if 
there’s a problem’ (McGaw cited in Smith 2014, np). We need to be mindful of the different 
purposes to which My School has potentially been put to use.  
 
This paper employs notions from actor-network theory and Foucauldian scholarship to unsettle 
commonplace assumptions about the extent My School operates as a market device. These two 
perspectives inform the paper’s notions of calculative device, market device and calculative 
practice (Callon 1998; Callon & Muniesa 2005; Miller 2008; Muniesa, Millo, & Callon 2007), 
which it uses to explore My School and its relationship to parents and neoliberal government. 
Following a description of the analytical perspective taken by the paper, I examine the website in 
light of the notion of calculative market device, with a concern for how its technical assemblage 
potentially positions parents, and I speculate about whether it facilitates market forms of agency 
commonly associated with neoliberal political objectives. The examination speculates that My 
School’s features enable calculations, but the site cannot facilitate a complete choice-making 
market agency through its use alone. This paper concludes by opening the analysis of My School 
to its political role as a technology of self-government tied to the abovementioned rationalities of 
transparency and responsiveness. I contend the site aims to support parents to conduct themselves 
as conscientious and informed educational agents by promoting calculativeness and a calculated, 
but not necessarily choice-making, form of parental agency. 
 
Calculative devices and calculation  
 
Consonant with the principles of actor-network theory (Latour 2005), Callon (1998) emphasizes 
the role and associations of non-human material devices, or ‘actors’, to calculation. Calculative 
capacities are not purely innate because whether an individual is assessing the value of a school, 
estimating the cost of a used car, or deciding on a course of action, the individual becomes a 
‘centre of calculation’ (Latour 2005) only by employing devices that enable calculated thought. 
Callon (1998) writes: 
 
Calculating – we shall limit ourselves here to this point – is a complex collective practice 
which involves far more than the capacities granted to agents by epistemologists and 
certain economists. The material reality of calculation, involving figures, writing 
mediums and inscriptions… are decisive in performing calculations. From the fact that 
calculations are made in the quasi-laboratories of calculative agencies (the word agent 
places too much weight on the individual) we should not infer that there are calculative 
beings, no matter how well or poorly informed they may be. From collective performance 
we cannot induce individual mental competence. (Callon 1998, 4-5) 
 
In short, the ‘equipment’ of calculation is not entirely situated in the human brain, and instead we 
must look to social and institutional technologies as the conditions for calculation and calculated 
action (Callon 1998; Callon & Muniesa 2005; Fourcade 2007). This speaks to the constitutive 
nature of calculative devices. Calculative devices render reason and calculation possible. They 
also render the world intelligible and, under the condition of that intelligibility, make it amenable 
to certain forms of action, certain kinds of agency (Miller & Rose 1992).  
 
Pertinently, calculative devices do not enjoin individuals to simply make numerical calculations. 
The dichotomy between pure rationality and pure judgment creates the spurious belief that 
calculation is a singular practice of pure numerical operations. But, non-arithmetic qualitative 
judgment can be calculative too (Lave 1986). Blurring the distinction between calculation and 
judgment, Callon and Muniesa (2005) posit that calculation ‘starts by establishing distinctions 
between things or states of the world, and by imagining and estimating courses of action 
associated with things or with those states as well as their consequences’ (2005, 1231). They 
outline a three-step process of calculation where calculative devices take a central role in the 
process: 
 
 First, for calculation to occur, entities must be taken into account by being arranged and 
organized in a single space: ‘…it is the ‘account’ itself but also, by extension, the surface 
on which the entities to calculate are moved… then compared and manipulated on the 
basis of a common operating principle’ (Callon & Muniesa 2005, 1231). These spaces, 
which may include an invoice, trading screen or a supermarket trolley, constitute different 
forms of calculation.  
 Second, once the entities are sorted, the entities are ‘associated with one another and 
subjected to manipulations and transformations, still in a very material sense’ (2005, 
1231). Consider, for example, the income and expenditure columns of a spreadsheet, or 
the comparison of two mobile phones on a webpage.  
 The third step is to obtain a result from the previous two steps. ‘A new entity must be 
produced (a sum, an ordered list, an evaluation, a binary choice, etc.), which corresponds 
precisely to the manipulations effected in the calculative space’ (2005, 1231). For 
example, the result of multiplying two figures, or the choice of a mobile phone based on 
the ‘value’ of each. The result extracted must ‘be able to leave the calculative space and 
circulate elsewhere in an acceptable way (without taking along all the calculative 
apparatus)’ (2005, 1231).  
 
In other words, calculative devices take entities into account, sort and arrange these entities to 
facilitate comparison and evaluation, and they enable the extraction of a result, or a value of some 
kind. Accordingly, calculation can ‘either meet the requirements of algorithmic formulation or be 
closer to intuition or judgement’ (Callon & Muniesa 2005, 1232), or ‘qualculation’ (Cochoy 2008). 
To what extent does My School resemble a calculative device thus conceived?  
 
My School as a calculative device 
 
My School can be viewed as a calculative device that seeks to constitute ‘school performance’ and 
configure the calculative thought and action of parents. The first step in a calculation is the taking 
of account, which is a product of ‘specific metrological work and heavy investment in measuring 
equipment’ (Callon et al. 2002, 199). My School does this by rendering schools into entities with 
knowable and calculable qualities. The website is organized around individual schools, rather than 
indicators, to enable each school’s performance to be taken into account. The properties of schools 
and school performance are contained on the five webpages allocated to profiling each school: (1) 
a school profile page; (2) a school finances page; (3) a NAPLAN results page; (4) statistics on 
vocational education and training provided; and (5) a local schools page.  
 
The process of taking account requires the construction of what Lingard & Rawolle (2011, 489) 
refer to as a ‘commensurate space of equivalence’. My School constructs this equivalence through 
the site’s standardized organization and the codification of school organization and performance 
into indicators and categories applied to all schools regardless of context. Depicting all schools 
according to these standardized attributes means grouping them on a single plane of equivalence, 
constituting a common ‘operating principle’ for judgment (Callon & Muniesa 2005, 1231). Like a 
balance sheet, a common visibility is accorded to each school for displaying results through the 
use of standardized charts, grids and graphs. Distinction accompanies this equivalence. Here, 
through the extraction of ‘information’ or data collected about each school according to the 
standardized categories and indicators, each school is carved out as a distinct and knowable entity. 
In this process of distinction, aided by principal comments, tables, charts and graphs, the 
qualitative and quantitative differences between schools, their inputs and their outputs are 
constructed, ordered and made visible and calculable.  
 
This technical construction enables schools to be associated and then evaluated. This is the next 
step in the process of calculation - associating and comparing the entities taken into account. All 
calculations require associating entities because comparison and ranking effectively yields the 
calculating agent a result (Callon 1998). The user is presented with tools that enable comparisons 
between schools on a range of qualities. Here, the profiling of each school ‘consists in establishing 
a calculative space in which it can be connected and compared to a finite list’ (Callon & Muniesa 
2005, 1235). As Gorur’s (2013) analysis of My School demonstrates, the numerical depiction of 
school performance by My School invites certain comparisons and judgments about ‘performance’. 
By enabling comparison (e.g. of staffing, income, expenditure, literacy and numeracy scores, rates 
of graduation and attendance) and the depiction and detection of variance to a standard, average or 
ideal, My School incites users to obtain a result, like an estimation of the quality of individual 
schools, or identifying which local school performs best, identifying which school has the best 
rate of graduation, or calculating which numeracy or literacy skills require improvement in a 
particular school. While My School enables calculations, does My School readily enable the 
making of a judgment of value that produces a course of action?  
 
My School as a market device 
 
In the analysis of markets, calculative devices and practices are often assumed to play a minimal 
role in rendering markets knowable and operable (Miller 2008). Many sociological accounts of 
markets take a sociologically realist and rationalist perspective that assumes the a priori existence 
of a unified society and market (Fourcade 2007). But, understanding markets means closely 
studying the technologies and practices that constitute markets in their specificity. The 
examination of marketisation in education is increasingly attending to the role of technologies, 
practices, institutions and power dynamics in constituting the relations, spaces and categories 
through which we think and act society and markets (Gorur 2013). This paper views localized 
calculative practices and devices as crucial in the contrivance of markets, like education quasi-
markets, because individuals must be able to calculate; for example, to ‘calculate compromises on 
the values of goods’ (Callon & Muniesa 2005, 1230). This section offers a close analysis of My 
School using Callon and Muniesa’s (2005) notion of market device.  
 
So, what constitutes a calculative device as economic? According to Muniesa et al. (2007, 3), ‘An 
economic agencement is, in a broadest sense, one that renders things, behaviours and processes 
economic’. Here, calculative devices might constitute the goods, agencies and exchanges that 
compose markets or quasi-markets as calculable goods, calculative agencies and calculated 
exchanges (Callon & Muniesa 2005). Calculative market devices are a kind of economic device 
that emphasizes ‘the conception, production and circulation of goods, their valuation, the 
construction and subsequent transfer of property rights though monetary mediation, exchange 
mechanisms and system of prices’ (Muniesa et al. 2007, 4). Market devices render entities 
knowable as economic goods or as objects of attachment. They may facilitate exchange, such as 
school prospectuses which attempt to attract enrolments, or circulate economic information, such 
as benchmarking regimes which feed information into supply chains to improve economic 
competitiveness (Larner & Le Heron 2004). Calculative devices are not necessarily economic in 
nature, but they can be rendered economic through their hybridization with other devices. How, 
then, does My School compare to such a conceptualization of a market device? 
 
The sociological criticism of My School is that through the practices of comparison the site 
enables the calculation of school value and the arrival at a choice. My School, it could be said, 
ascribes to schools a range of qualities, and then positions schools ‘in a space of goods, in a 
system of differences and similarities, of distinct yet connected categories’ (Callon, 2002 198). 
Gorur (2013) describes this as schools being ‘systematically tagged, valued, sorted and placed in 
appropriate aisles and shelves in a kind of virtual supermarket’ (2013, 221). The value an 
individual ascribes to a school hinges upon how it compares to other schools, in this case the 
distinctions that are made between the qualities (e.g. performance data) of each school. In this 
interpretation, by enabling comparison, the users of My School can estimate, know and rank the 
value of their options, which then gives the calculating agent their preference (Callon 1998). 
Accordingly, My School contributes to the political construction of an education quasi-market by 
facilitating choice and exchange. But, can My School readily produce market agency? 
 
An economic calculation depends on the service of schooling being rendered into a ‘calculable 
good’ (of value to the market) that can become the object of an economic transaction. A 
calculable good is a result of a process of objectification (delimiting a thing), building consumer 
attachments by giving products qualities, and making goods comparable (Callon & Muniesa 2005). 
This process is organized around three key mechanisms: objectification, singularization, and the 
simultaneous attachment of goods to consumers. If we assume that as a market device My School 
commoditizes schools, then the ‘profiling’ of each school represents the process of objectification, 
or shaping schools into certain kinds of entities; the ‘consumer can make choices only if the goods 
have been endowed with properties that produce distinctions’ (Callon & Muniesa 2005, 1235), 
and the resulting goods are made comparable to a finite list of other goods. But the formation of 
calculable goods depends on the process of singularization.  
 
Singularization ‘consists in a gradual definition of the properties of the product, shaped in such a 
way that it can enter the consumer’s world and become attached to it’ (Callon & Muniesa 2005, 
1233-1234). This is the enactment of an ‘economy of qualities’ (Callon et al. 2002) where 
economic actors qualify goods for competitive advantage. With My School, this is largely done 
through a comment box at the top of each school’s profile page. The comment box is an 
opportunity for each school principal to ‘present key aspects of the school, including its mission, 
values and focus’ (ACARA 2013). Through the description, principals invite users to make 
quality-based rational judgments (Cochoy 2008) as they express the value offered by their school, 
which cannot be captured by the numbers of test scores alone. These descriptions exemplify 
‘corporate performance’, like that of school prospectuses where schools position themselves 
favorably in relation to a field of competitors (Meadmore & Meadmore 2004, 385).  
 
But, My School largely limits the process of singularization to each principal’s comments because 
the qualification of schools, and decisions about how they are presented to the market, occurs with 
limited market input. In the commercial sphere, economic agents qualify and build consumer 
interest in a product through a range of mechanisms, including product testing, trialing and 
consumer feedback. This is how consumers can become attached to goods, or how a ‘thing is 
transformed into a good to which an economic agent assigns a value’ (Callon & Muniesa 2005, 
1233). With My School, the qualities of schools are largely pre-determined. The site qualifies 
schools through political and expert discourses that define the standard criteria for measuring 
school performance (test results, graduation rates, staff numbers, etc.). Schools and ‘the market’ 
exercise little influence over the language, categories or qualities attributed to schools, the 
definition of ‘performance’, or how schools will be presented on the website. These are stabilized 
in bureaucratic and ICT networks, and therefore become relatively closed and inflexible.  
 
The problem here is whether parents share the website’s normative assumptions about the value of 
tests, the quality of the measures, and what defines performance. Research suggests many parents 
might not. Ball and Vincent’s (1998, 393) study of the use of “grapevine knowledge” in the 
selection of schools found “the social contexts of choice are as or more important than the 
abstract/objective qualities of goods.” School reputation, proximity to home, and the use of 
traditional forms of discipline, curriculum and pedagogy are identified as more important factors 
in choice making than academic quality (Campbell et al. 2009; Whitty et al. 1998). Despite this, 
the standard formatting of My School dictates to My School users that schools and their activities, 
outcomes and value are to be known and judged according to ‘objective’ measures. The lack of 
parental input into this process of qualification potentially leads to a weak attachment to schools 
and the qualities, classifications and evaluative principles underpinning the site. Moreover, the 
standardized format, while facilitating comparison, results in limited singularization and this 
produces weak attachment and strong substitutability when it comes to arriving at a judgment or 
obtaining a result (Callon & Muniesa 2005). Relatedly, My School is not equipped to build these 
attachments because it restricts the processes of requalification, which is ‘at the heart of the 
dynamics of economic markets’ (Callon et al. 2002, 200). For Callon et al., requalification is ‘the 
ability to modify the list of qualities’ and ‘is a strategic resource since it is a matter of positioning 
the good in a space of goods’ (Callon et al. 2002, 200). My School does not facilitate this process 
as schools are constrained in adjusting and responding to potential ‘purchasers’ or competitors. 
This disables them from giving their schools value as a calculable good that parents can readily 
become attached. Consequently, in order to form an attachment and accomplish a choice, users 
might need to utilize other calculative devices and practices that give schools value. 
 
The final step in an economic calculation is for a consumer to obtain a result in terms of choice, 
where we could expect the resulting entity ‘to be able to leave the calculative space and circulate 
elsewhere in an acceptable way’ (Callon & Muniesa 2005, 1231). My School does not readily 
enable this. While the data on the site indicates quantifiable reference points that parents can 
calculate, these do not indicate the overall value proposition of a school. My School does not 
directly inform parents which schools are superior – there is, for instance, no ranked list. The 
website has avoided this, and it stops third parties from doing so through a Terms of Use 
agreement. My School instead expects users, who have varying levels of literacy, to interpret the 
voluminous data provided to them. While a market requires access to information about a good or 
product for informed calculated decision-making (Callon & Muniesa 2005), too much information 
inhibits the practice of estimating value and ranking through comparison, producing a situation of 
‘non-calculation’ (Callon & Muniesa 2005, 1232). Even if a user does arrive at a choice, My 
School limits the capacity for exchange. Compare, for instance, My School to the techniques of 
retail websites whose goal is to unashamedly obtain from its user a choice and an exchange. Retail, 
comparison and aggregate websites facilitate choice making through simple graphic indicators of 
overall quality or value, and customer reviews. These techniques enable the user to conduct 
himself or herself as a purchaser capable of arriving at a calculated judgment of value, and to act 
on this judgment by executing a choice. My School, however, does not effectively embed school 
data into such economic agencements that could facilitate direct economic choice making and 
exchange.  
 
Summarily, then, as a calculative device, My School renders schools into calculable and 
comparable entities and its users into calculating agents comparing and judging aspects of schools 
and school performance. However, overall My School’s features do not effectively render schools 
into calculable economic goods that appeal to most consumers, nor many parents into calculating 
consumers. The claim I make here is speculative because no empirical research was conducted 
into parents’ actual choice-making behavior, and little research exists of parents’ use of the site. 
Nevertheless, analyzing the website using the notion of market device allows us to speculate that 
choice-making agencies are not readily producible by the website. This may in fact reflect the 
quasi-market nature of the education market – the site creates and responds to a market heavily 
shaped by political and bureaucratic objectives, rationalities, and regulations, rather than 
consumer desires and values. This is not to claim the website is a failure, or that people cannot use 
it to make economic or school choices. If we shift the focus to principals’ use of My School, the 
site can be deployed in economistic regimes of competition (Niesche 2013). That said, the above 
analysis cautions against essentialising the website as an ‘instrument of economic rationality, 
which simply by being used, imposes on the agents a coherence and calculating logic that is 




I conclude this paper by turning to Foucauldian scholarship to offer a perspective on the 
calculative agency of parents’ use of My School. In particular, I am interested in how political and 
governmental authorities deploy a ‘whole range of practices that constitute, define, organize, and 
instrumentalize the strategies that individuals in their freedom can use in dealing with each other’ 
(Foucault 1997, p. 300; Foucault 2008), or indeed to use in relation to him/herself in their practice 
of self-government. The concern here is with how technologies like My School are potentially 
used as technologies of government and self-formation. In education, managerial technologies 
within organizations have driven calculative practices through which workers (professionals, 
managers, etc.) construe and conduct themselves as entrepreneurial, economic, self-responsible, 
prudent and moral subjects of government (Gobby 2013; Peters 1996). In concerning myself with 
the subjective-ethical formation of parents through My School, I am mindful of Miller’s (2008) 
analytical attention to the political and governmental ideals attached to certain calculative 
technologies, and how these shape the conditions of individual and collective conduct to specified 
ends (Miller & Napier 1993; Rose, 1991; Rose & Miller 1992). He argues that the ‘technological 
turn’ to the analysis of the economy and markets has yet to be matched by a ‘similar concern with 
the programs or ‘ideas’ that articulate, animate and give significance to particular ways of 
calculating’ (Miller 2008, 53). Unlike the current literature on My School, this final section 
explores the website in relation to the powerful political discourses of transparency, 
responsiveness and ‘active citizenship’ mentioned in the introduction. 
 
While the data generated within organizations, like education systems, were once kept within 
those confines, neoliberalism has transformed the access to and use of data. Data is now moving 
beyond professional, bureaucratic and governmental enclosures. Today, data related to 
government services is reaching into the family home, with websites like MyUniversity, MyHealth, 
MyAgedCare and My School exemplifying this incursion. The creation of these ‘my tools’ of 
agency represents a neoliberal transformation of social and economic government. Here, public 
service providers are opened to greater public scrutiny and influence, and citizens are expected as 
a matter of social, economic and moral obligation to be active in their self-government (Rose 
1999). As active agents, citizens must involve themselves in the institutions of government that 
attempt to govern them, or exercise choice in their use of services. In education, deregulation, 
privatization and school choice policies discursively mobilise the figure of the active parent. 
Although activating parental educational agency and decision-making is an historical phenomenon 
(Hunter 1993; Smith 1993), governments over the last couple of decades have intensified their 
attempts to transfer to parents many responsibilities (such as for school enrolments) that were 
previously those of education bureaucracies. Leaving decision-making to the state is increasingly 
construed as risky, even irresponsible. In effect, parents must calculate their interest as prudent 
and informed subjects of risk (O’Malley 1996), and this requires access to ‘information’, to data.  
Governments are therefore committed to distributing calculability and calculativeness. My School 
enacts this transformation to parental agency.  
 
My School emerged in an ensemble of educational reforms associated with the political goals of 
increasing parents’ educational agency, and ‘improving market design – so that we work to create 
the conditions in which markets serve the public interest…’ (ALP 2010, 5). As a calculative tool, 
My School is a technique of power that proposes new calculative practices linked to the objective 
of ‘changing the way Australian parents think and talk about our schools’ (ALP 2010, 7). 
Providing the tools to compare and assess schools according to mainly quantitative organizational 
and performance criteria, My School positions parents as active calculators of school performance. 
It is a matter of individual, economic and social responsibility that parents calculate to ‘know the 
facts’, and to accomplish responsible and informed decisions. My School should be regarded as a 
pedagogical techne that fashions the self as it shapes the forms of calculation of its users. It is one 
means to ‘establish and promote particular human capacities – including those we might wish to 
regard as ‘reasoning’ – within bodies of knowledge and types of rationality, forms of power and 
government, and ethical practices’ (Dean 1994, 63). The ethical ideal established for parents is an 
arguably calculative parental agency. My School equips parents with calculativeness, and the 
obligation to engage in a form of calculation or forethought about their child’s education, and 
about the provision of governmental services and their use of them, as one might in other arenas 
of life. Through technologies of My School, parents are ‘schooled’ into calculating using 
politically-valued forms of calculation and reasoning (e.g. test data). Given the broader neoliberal 
reforms to schooling, it is becoming an inescapable responsibility for parents to actively negotiate 
the risky educational space.. 
 
This parental activation must not be narrowly conceived as the sovereign consumer seeking 
maximum utility and advantage through market exchange (Wilkins 2010). While My School is a 
calculative device that can inform judgments about schools, when it comes to parents, its design 
limits economic calculability, including the extraction of an economic result. I contend the site 
does not effectively orchestrate attachment and the deployment of choice, and the site might 
struggle to effectively enroll parents into its use as a decision tool (see Rowe & Windle 2012). 
While some people may use My School as a tool for choice-making, given the limitations 
identified in this paper and the qualitative nature of the calculations parents are known to make 
about schools, the website might prove to be marginal to this process. But, even if My School is a 
potentially ineffective market device for the purpose of securing choice-making conduct broadly 
as I have speculated, it nevertheless reflects an increasing obligation of citizens to participate in 
their own self-government. The enrolling of parents into its use is tied to the cultivation of the 
modern parent whose thoughts and behaviours must subscribe to what Callon and Muniesa (2005) 
observe as an emerging single implacable logic that is becoming hegemonic: that of calculation as 
the only possibility for action. I contend that My School reflects an emerging obligation in the 
education domain that parents should be active educational agents, and a condition of their 
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